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Abstract
In this paper, we show that 2
3 is the minimal quota that guarantees the transitivity of a
complete majority relation. We argue that this quota is important for the process of nego-
tiation that may take place when a group has to take a clear-cut decision under a speciﬁc
quota-rule.
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1 Introduction
The pairwise majority rule may lead to intransitivities (cycles) which makes it im-
possible to ﬁnd a straightforward solution to pick up a winner from the set of al-
ternatives. A way out of this problem is to require the support of more than a half
of the population to consider that an alternative is better than another. We enter the
domain of quota-rules. It is well known (Ferejohn & Grether 1974, Peleg 1978)
that when n alternatives are in an electoral competition, it is sufﬁcient and neces-
sary to require the support of more than (n−1)/n of the population to be sure that
no cycle may appear in the qualiﬁed majority relation. Unfortunately, this fraction,
that we shall call quota and denote λ in the remainder, tends to 1 as the number of
alternatives increases, i.e. to be considered socially better than an alternative y, the
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2 e-mail: vidu@econ.unicaen.fralternative x must be preferred to y by “almost” all the individuals. The absence of
intransitivities does not help the decision since it leaves the place to a likely empty
binary relation. Indeed, when the quota is not obtained then the two involved alter-
natives should be considered “incomparable”. 3 This conclusion is a pain when a
clear-cut decision has to be taken. Let us give two examples.
For historical reasons, a pope is elected if he casts more than two-thirds of the votes
and it is necessary that a pope is elected. This means that the cardinals have to deal
and negotiate in order to attain the required quota of two-thirds. 4
Another example may be found in Sidney Lumet’s movie “Twelve Angry Men”
(1957) of which action takes place on the stage of the jury room. The jurors have
to decide whether a young Spanish-American is guilty or innocent of murdering
his father. For a decision to be taken, the thirteen jurors have to agree (possibly
at the expense of negotiation). After a ﬁrst vote, the tally is 12:1 in favor of the
condemnation to death. After some (hours of) negotiation, the minority position
—acquittal— turns into a unanimity and the young man released.
Inbothexamples,thenegotiationgoesonaslongasthedecisionisnottaken. 5 This
article ﬁnds its motivation in this particular framework where the members have to
negotiate until the group is able to perform a clear-cut decision on the basis of a
λ-majority relation. Intuitively, it is clear that if the number of candidates and/or the
quota increase then a decision might be more difﬁcult to achieve. In other words, it
is most likely that negotiation will be necessary to perform a decision.
As far as the quota is concerned, we face the following dilemma. When the quota is
low (one-half) the pairwise majority relation is complete but not necessarily tran-
sitive. When the quota is high (more than (n − 1)/n where n is the number of
candidates in competition), the pairwise qualiﬁed-majority relation is acyclic but
not necessarily complete. Of course, when λ is intermediate, the relation may be
incomplete and contain some cycles.
We show in this article that when the quota λ is greater than 2
3, then a complete
λ-majority relation is necessarily transitive. Remarkably, this quota is independent
of the number alternatives in competition. This sharply contrasts with the result of
3 Although each member of the group performs this comparison.
4 This example was reported in Saari (1996).
5 Of course some device may be set up to encourage a quick decision. This is actually
done in a stringent way for the pope election (Fanning 1911)
“When the cardinals found themselves face to face with [the situation where the 2
3 has not been obtained] on the death
of Clement IV in 1268, they commissioned six cardinals as plenipotentiaries to decide on a candidate. The vacancy of
the Holy See had lasted for two years and nine months. To prevent a recurrence of this evil, the Second Council of Lyons
under Gregory X (1274) decreed that ten days after the pope’s decease, the cardinals should assemble in the palace in
the city in which the pope died, and there hold their electoral meetings, entirely shut out from all outside inﬂuences. If
they did not come to an agreement on a candidate in three days, their victuals were to lessened, and after a further delay
of ﬁve days, the food supply was to be still further restricted. This is the origin of conclaves.”
2Ferejohn and Grether (1974).
We believe that this result may offer an interesting framework to negotiation pro-
cesses.
After having introduced the necessary deﬁnitions and notation (section 2), we give
our main result (section 3) and conclude by discussing of open problems related to
negotiation (section 4).
2 Deﬁnitions and notation
We shall always consider X as a ﬁnite set of n alternatives and V a ﬁnite set of v
voters.
A binary relation R over X is a collection of couples (x,y) such that both x and
y belong to X. When the couple (x,y) belongs to the binary relation R, then we
shall write xRy. A path is a sequence of alternatives x0,...,xk ∈ X such that
xjRxj+1 for every j ∈ {0,...,k − 1}. The length of such a path is k. If there
exists a path encompassing the whole set X and of length n − 1, then the relation
is hamiltonian. A cycle is a sequence of alternatives x0,...,xk ∈ X describing a
pathandsuchthatxkRx0.AbinaryrelationR isquasi-completeifforeverydistinct
x,y ∈ X,(¬xRy) =⇒ yRx. It is complete if it is quasi-complete and reﬂexive. It
is anti-symmetric if for every x,y ∈ X, we have xRy and yRx if and only if x = y.
It is transitive if for every x,y,z ∈ X, xRy and yRz implies xRz. It is acyclic if
it contains no cycle, i.e. if for every distinct x0,x1,...,xk such that xjRxj+1 for
every j ∈ {0,...,k − 1}, we have ¬xkRx0. It is connected if for every x,y ∈ X,
there exists a sequence x = x0,x1,...,xk = y ∈ X such that xjRxj+1 or xj+1Rxj
for every j ∈ {0,...,k − 1}.
We denote Bin(X) the set of binary relations deﬁned over X, Acy(X) the set of
acyclic binary relations, Ord(X) the set of complete, anti-symmetric and transi-
tive binary relations (linear ordering), Tour(X) is the set of complete and anti-
symmetric binary relations (tournaments).
Analternativex ∈ X isamaximalelementoftherelationR ifthereisnoalternative
y ∈ X (y 6= x) such that yRx.
We assume that each individual i ∈ V is endowed with a preference Pi ∈ Ord(X)
and we deﬁne a proﬁle π = (P1,...,Pv) as the list of all the individual preferences.
For any λ ∈ [1
2,1[, given a proﬁle π ∈ Ord(X)V, we deﬁne the λ-majority relation
as follows: ∀x,y ∈ X : xMλ(π)y ⇐⇒ #{i ∈ V : xPiy} > λ.v where #Y is the
cardinality of the set Y .
3We deﬁne the range of the λ-majority as the set of binary relations than can be
obtained through the λ-majority rule. Formally, Ran(λ,X) = {R ∈ Bin(X) : ∃V
and π ∈ Ord(X)V such that for every x,y ∈ X, xRy ⇐⇒ xMλ(π)y}. Notice
that we don’t restrict the number of voters.
3 A transitive 2
3-majority relation
McGarvey (1953) has shown that for any ﬁnite set X, every tournament could be
obtained from a pairwise (simple) majority voting, i.e. Ran(1
2,X) = Tour(X)
and allowed the study of tournaments from a voting theoretical point of view. 6
Mala (1998) proved that there exists some tournaments that can not be obtained
through pairwise λ-majority relation, as soon as λ is strictly greater than a 1
2, i.e.
Ran(λ,X) $ Tour(X). This latter result excludes a systematic study of tourna-
ments under the arguments of quota-rules.
Ferejohn and Grether (1974) proved that for any ﬁnite set X of n ≤ m elements,
then for every π ∈ Acy(X)V and every λ ∈ [m−1
m ,1[, we have Mλ(π) ∈ Acy(X).
This means that the λ-majority relation contains no cycle as soon as the quota is
greater than or equal to n−1
n . This result is the lower bound of λ that guarantees the
existence of a maximal element in the λ-majority relation, but not its uniqueness.
The next theorem states that if the quota λ is greater than or equal to 2
3, for any
number of alternatives, if the λ-majority relation is complete, then it is transitive,
that is to say, it contains a unique maximal element.
Theorem 1 For any ﬁnite set X of n ≥ 3 alternatives.
i. ∀λ ∈ [1
2, 2
3[,Ran(λ,X) ∩ Comp(X) % Ord(X)
ii. ∀λ ∈ [2
3,1[,Ran(λ,X) ∩ Comp(X) = Ord(X)
Proof. First, we need to show that for any ﬁnite set X and any quota λ ∈ [1
2,1[,
Ord(X) ⊆ Ran(λ,X). In that purpose, consider any binary relation P ∈ Ord(X)
and the unanimous proﬁle π = (P,...,P) ∈ Ord(X)V. For any λ ∈ [1
2,1[ and
every x,y ∈ X : #{i ∈ V : xPiy} = v > λv. The λ-majority relation is identical
to P so that P ∈ Ran(λ,X) ⊇ Ord(X). Then, because Ord(X) ⊂ Comp(X), it
is clear that ∀λ ∈ [1
2,1[, Ord(X) ⊆ Ran(λ,X) ∩ Comp(X).
To prove i., we show that for any set X of n ≥ 3 alternatives and any λ ∈ [1
2, 2
3[
there exists a proﬁle π such that the λ−majority relation is complete but not transi-
tive.
6 See Laslier (1997) for an extensive exposition on the topic.
4Let X = {x1,...,xn} be the set of alternatives and consider a set V = {1,2,3} of





We observe that #{i ∈ V : x1Pix2} = #{i ∈ V : x2Pix3} = #{i ∈ V :
x3Pix1} = 2 and for every other pair, we have #{i ∈ V : xPiy} = 3 or #{i ∈ V :
yPix} = 3. This implies that for any λ ∈ [1
2, 2
3[, we have x1Mλ(π)x2, x2Mλ(π)x3,
x3Mλ(π)x1 and for every other pair xMλ(π)y or yMλ(π)x. The relation Mλ(π) ∈
Comp(X)\Ord(X). This proves i.
To prove ii., we consider any non-transitive and complete λ-majority relation T and
suppose that λ > 2
3. Hence, there must exist a set of voters V = {1,...,v} and a
proﬁle π = (P1,...,Pv) ∈ Ord(X)V that lead to Mλ(π) = T for a λ > 2
3.
HararyandMoser(1966)haveshownthatsucharelationT mustcontaina3−cycle,
i.e. a cycle involving three alternatives. Without loss of generality, we suppose that
this 3-cycle can be written x1Tx2Tx3Tx1.
Let us denote C1 = {i ∈ V : x1Pix2}, C2 = {i ∈ V : x2Pix3} and C3 = {i ∈ V :
x3Pix1}.
By assumption, #C1 > 2
3v, #C2 > 2
3v and #C3 > 2
3v. By basic set theoretical
properties, we ﬁnd that #C1 + #C2 − #(C1 ∩ C2) = #(C1 ∪ C2) ≤ v, which
implies #(C1 ∩C2) > 1
3v. By the same arguments, we have #(C1 ∩C3) > 1
3v and
#(C2 ∩ C3) > 1
3v.
Finally, v ≥ #((C1∩C2)∪(C2∩C3)∪(C1∩C3)) = #(C1∩C2)+#(C1∩C3)+
#(C2 ∩ C3) − #(C1 ∩ C2 ∩ C3). It must be that #(C1 ∩ C2 ∩ C3) > 0.
This latter inequality implies that there exists at least one individual that belongs
simultaneously to C1, C2 et C3, which is impossible since this individual would
exhibit non-transitive preferences. The proﬁle V supposed to have induced the re-
lation T through the λ-majority rule does not exists. We conclude that any intran-
sitivity in the λ-majority relation is impossible when λ ∈ [2
3,1[ as soon as one
assumes it is complete. 
This result is of course in no contradiction with Ferejohn and Grether (1974).
54 The problems related to negotiation
Let us now consider the problem of a clear-cut decision to be taken by a committee.
We consider a set V of v voters and a set X of n alternatives. Each voter is endowed
with a complete linear ordering over X. The decision rule consists in choosing the
maximal (non dominated) element of a λ-majority relation. If such an element does
not exist or is not unique, then the voters have to negotiate in order to obtain a
unique maximal element. Of course, we consider that the quota λ is given a priori
and should not be changed during the negotiation.
The most important arising question is to know whether there exists a quota that
guarantees the absence of negotiation. The answer is clearly negative except in the
trivial and particular case where only two alternatives are in competition and an
odd number of voters have to decide under majority rule. When more than three
alternatives are in competition, it can be the case that no Condorcet’s winner exists
under the majority rule. A Condorcet’s winner is an alternative that defeats any
other alternative in pairwise λ-majority 7 . For any number of alternatives, the λ-
majority relation may not be complete which implies that several maximalelements
may coexist.
Negotiation is intrinsically a dynamic process and should then be treated as such.
We believe that game theory may constitute a fruitful approach to this problem.
Many authors, see for instance Ellison (1993), Kandori et al. (1993), Young (1993),
Blume et al. (1993) or Blume (1998), have studied global or local interactions be-
tween the members of a group. The general context is that of a group of agents hav-
ing to play repeatedly a 2×2 symmetric game against a random opponent. At each
period, the strategy of a player is chosen according to its current relative success.
In order to depart from the deterministic evolution, a random “noise” is introduced
so that, on rare occasions, a player may not follow the deterministic rule. Under
various assumptions, they study the way the system converges to a state where the
game is played at some equilibrium.
The question is to know whether is is possible to deﬁne a similar setting that may
converge towards a situation in which a clear-cut λ-majority decision can be taken.
One may expect that different settings lead to different proﬁles of strategies and
hence describe different negotiation processes. An important question, raised in El-
lison (1993), deals with the rate at which the system converges. Does the system
converge more rapidly towards a clear-cut decision when the quota is 2
3 or n−1
n ? In
other word, is it true that a complete binary relation obtained through a quota of
two-thirds is easier to obtain through a negotiation process than an acyclic hamil-
tonian binary relation obtained through a quota of n−1
n ?
7 The original deﬁnition of a Condorcet’s winner (Condorcet (1785)) was given for
λ = 1
2, but we think that it would have been splitting-hairs and misleading to deﬁne a
λ-Condorcet’s winner.
6We believe that the problem of rate of convergence is related to the “distance”
between the preference proﬁle (before any negotiation) and the proﬁle of strategies
adopted (after the negotiation process is over) when the clear cut-decision can be
taken. Let π = (P1,...,Pv) be a proﬁle of preferences and Dλ ⊂ Ord(X)N be
the set of proﬁles such that a clear-cut decision can be taken through the λ-majority
relation. For any R,R0 ∈ Ord(X), let δ(R,R0) = #{(a,b) ∈ X × X : aRb ⇐⇒
bR0a} be the Kemeny-Young (Kemeny 1959, Young 1988) distance between R
and R0. We deﬁne the distance 8 ∆(π,S) =
P
i∈V δ(Pi,Si) between the proﬁle
of preferences π and the proﬁle of strategies adopted after the negotiation process
S ∈ Dλ.
Several questions arise : does there exist some negotiation process converging
rapidly toward a proﬁle of strategies that is at a minimal distance form the pref-
erence proﬁle? Does the choice obtained from a negotiation process depend on the
quota? Is the criterion of minimal distance a good criterion from an axiomatic point
of view? In the light of these considerations, is there a best quota?
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